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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze an agent who misin-
terprets or misperceives the true decision problem she faces. Within this framework,
we show that a wide range of behavior observed in experimental settings manifest as
failures to perceive implications, in other words, to properly account for the logical
relationships between various payoff relevant contingencies. We present behavioral
characterizations corresponding to several benchmarks of logical sophistication and
show how it is possible to identify which implications the agent fails to perceive. Thus,
our framework delivers both a methodology for assessing an agent’s level of contingent
thinking and a strategy for identifying her beliefs in the absence full rationality.
Keywords: Bounded rationality, contingent thinking, subjective beliefs, monotonic-
ity.
JEL Classification: C72, D81, D84, D91.
1 Motivation
When facing complicated and uncertain environments, economic agents often fail to
act optimally, choosing actions which do not maximize their expected payoff. An
intuitive explanation, and one often appealed to in the experimental and behavioral
literature, is that agents misinterpret or misperceive the true decision problem they
face—for example, assessing likelihoods in a manner incompatible with classical
probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Schmeidler, 1989), failing to properly
condition beliefs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Thaler, 1988; Esponda and Vespa,
2014), or simply misunderstanding experimental directions or elicitation techniques
(Plott and Zeiler, 2005).
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2 1 Motivation
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze an agent whose
subjective representation of a decision problem may diverge from the analyst’s or
experimenter’s (objective) representation. Within this framework, we show that
a wide range of observed behavior can be explained by agents’ failure to perceive
implications, in other words, to properly account for the logical relationships be-
tween various payoff relevant contingencies (this is sometimes referred to as ‘failures
of contingent thinking’). We present behavioral characterizations corresponding
to several benchmarks of rationality—benchmarks employed in the wider theoreti-
cal literature—relating the agent’s perception of logical implications to her betting
behavior, a standard decision theoretic primitive. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, we then turn to the identification problem, showing how it is possible within
our framework to identify which implications the agent fails to perceive.
For example, the contingency “the water is above 150 degrees” implies the con-
tingency “the water is boiling.” An agent who would prefer to bet on the former
rather than the latter, betrays a belief incompatible with understanding this impli-
cation. We show that from an agent’s preference over bets on contingencies, it is
possible to construct a subjective state-space model that entirely characterizes the
agent’s view of the uncertainty she faces, her level of rationality, and the implications
that she perceives.
Almost universally, economic models begin with the proscription of a state space,
Ω, and model an agent’s probabilistic judgements via a probability distribution (or
a more general probability like object), λ, over Ω. Each state ω ∈ Ω is interpreted
as the resolution of all uncertainties relevant to the decision problem at hand and
λ captures the agent’s beliefs about the likelihood of these various contingencies.
A state-space, however, exists only insofar as events can be described by an agent.
Real interactions with uncertainty, without fail, operate on the level of propositions
themselves, rather than on some abstract state-space. Indeed, interpersonal con-
tracts, insurance policies, economics experiments, etc. all describe the resolution of
uncertainty by directly representing the contingencies in human language. While it
is well known that under sufficient logical omniscience or rationality the abstraction
to a state space is without loss of generality, this is not the case for agents who are
not perfect contingent reasoners; in particular, assumptions about the structure of
the state space impose tacit restrictions on how the agent interprets contingencies
and thus how she might fail at contingent thinking.
Therefore, our paper begins with the more fundamental notion of eliciting an
agent’s uncertainty about verbal or linguistic contingencies (like “the water is boil-
ing”) rather than uncertainty about states in an exogenous state space. The first set
3of results then shows how it is possible to construct a state space (and probability)
that faithfully represents the agent’s uncertainty. As such, the interpretation of the
contingencies is a subjective aspect of the representation, rather than an exogenous
and implicitly imposed condition. These results provide a direct method of test-
ing the rationality of economic agents, and for identifying the agent’s perception
regrading logical implications between contingencies.
Some implications, such as the relation between “the temperature is above 150
degrees” and “the water is boiling,” rely on a physical background theory. An
agent’s failure to perceive this implication might arise from her not considering the
same theory as the modeler (perhaps she interprets ‘degrees’ in Fahrenheit rather
than Celsius or considers a different ambient pressure). Thus, an agent might take
actions inconsistent with the analyst’s predictions either because (i) she fails some
criterion of rationality or (ii) she is operating under a different background theory.
While our above mentioned behavioral characterizations allows the analyst to
discern between these two types of agents, our next set of results take on the task
of identifying, in the latter case, the subjective theory of the agent. For example,
an experimenter could find that a subject who is taking suboptimal actions may
be neither irrational nor have non-standard preferences, but instead have misinter-
preted the experimental instructions. In other words, the subject is acting optimally
conditional on her misinterpretation. In such a state of affairs, we provide the ex-
perimenter with the tools to identify which of the instructions the subject failed to
understand. Thus, our framework delivers a methodology for the analyst to both
asses the agent’s level of contingent thinking and identify to her beliefs even in the
absence of the usual tenets of rationality.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines
our model and main results by way of two extended examples. These examples are
taken directly from the experimental literature and exhibit how our model can be
used to explain real word decision making. Then, Section 3 introduces the model
and primitive. Section 4 then provides some basic representation results relating
the DM’s observable behavior to her ability to preform contingent thinking. Section
5 contains our identification results, exploring how our model allows a modeler to
identify the theory of an agent. A discussion of related literature is contained in
Section 6. Appendix A contains additional representation results. The Appendix
B is an application of the model to games: we show how our model can be used
to construct a Wald-Pearce type criterion determining rationalizability under non-
expected utility beliefs. Finally, Appendix C contains proofs omitted from the main
text.
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2 An Overview of our Syntactic Model and Results
We take as given a set of (logically connected) statements, L. These statements
regard the uncertainties faced in a decision problem: for example “the temperature
is above 150 degrees” or “the pressure is 1 bar and the temperature is above 150
degrees.” We assume the modeler can observe the agent’s probabilistic assessment
of statements, {pi(ϕ) ∈ [0, 1] | ϕ ∈ L}, where pi(ϕ) is interpreted as the probability
the agent places on ϕ being true.
Since the state-space is not exogenously given, we are interested in subjective
models of uncertainty. A subjective model of uncertainty is a triple (Ω, t, λ):
• Ω, a state space, is a set.
• t : L → 2Ω, a truth valuation, maps each statement to a subset of states
interpreted as those states in which the statement is true.
• λ : 2Ω → [0, 1], a likelihood assessment, maps subsets of the state space to the
0-1 interval (with λ(∅) = 0 and λ(Ω) = 1), interpreted as the likelihood of the
event.
Therefore, an agent whose view of uncertainty is represented by (Ω, t, λ) views
the states in Ω as the possible resolutions of uncertainty regarding the statements
of L: at ω exactly the statements {ϕ | ω ∈ t(ϕ)} are perceived to be true. Then λ
determines the the agent’s belief about the likelihood of these various resolutions. In
the usual way—for example, by relaxing additivity—λ can accommodate failures in
probabilistic reasoning. Similarly, t can accommodate failures in logical reasoning, if
for example t(“the pressure is 1 bar and the temperature is above 150 degrees”) 6=
t(“the pressure is 1 bar”) ∩ t(“the temperature is above 150 degrees”).
As a first task, we ask when is it possible to find a subjective model of uncertainty,
(Ω, t, λ), that faithfully captures the agent’s observable beliefs: that is, for each
ϕ ∈ L, the likelihood that ϕ is true as given by the model (Ω, t, λ) is the same as the
observed assessment pi(ϕ): in math, λ(t(ϕ)) = pi(ϕ). We show that it is in general
possible to construct a state-space representation, and that different assumptions
on rationality impose different constraints on the truth valuation and likelihood
assessment. This is important as is allows the modeler to work with the more
familiar state-space representation, both while using a more realistically observable
primitive while allowing for errors in reasoning.
We ask further how the properties of t and the properties of λ relate and more
generally, how these properties are related to conditions on the observable. Since t
5captures the agent’s logical reasoning and λ her probabilistic reasoning, our model
allows for the distinction between these two separate departures from from the
rational benchmark. We show that there is a tradeoff between these two forms of
reasoning, as evidenced by the following example, and explained in detail afterwards.
Example 1. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) provided subjects with the following
vignette:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. Linda is a teacher in elementary school. Linda works
in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
and asked them rank statements in order of likelihood including the following three:
f = “Linda is active in the feminist movement.”
t = “Linda is a bank teller.”
t ∧ f =“Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”
85% of subjects ranked f > t ∧ f > t in opposition to any objective (i.e., sound)
model of uncertainty, which on the basis that t ∧ f implies t, must rank the later
weakly more likely.
To make matters more concrete, lets assume that a subject assess the likelihoods
as pi(f) = 34 , pi(t ∧ f) =
1
2 , and pi(t) =
1
4 . First, notice that we can represent these
assessments via a subjective model of uncertainty (Ω, t, λ) with a probability measure
λ, by permitting flexibility in t: set Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and t : f 7→ {ω1, ω2},t 7→ {ω2}
and t ∧ f 7→ {ω2, ω3}. Let λ be the probability measure given by λ(ω1) =
1
2 and
λ(ω2) = λ(ω3) =
1
4 . Clearly, λ(t(ϕ)) = pi(ϕ) for each statement ϕ, but representing
the subject’s departure from rationality forces the truth valuation to be logically
flawed: despite t being a logically implication of t∧ f, in state ω3, the later is true
but the former is not.
From this, one might be tempted to conclude that the subject has perfect prob-
abilistic judgment (setting the interpretation of statements aside, her probabilistic
reasoning as given by λ is additive and so coincides with the rational benchmark).
However, (Ω, t, λ) is but one of many representations of her observable behavior:
Consider (Ω, t′, λ′) with Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, t
′ : f 7→ {ω1, ω2},t 7→ {ω2, ω3}, and
as dictated by the logical connection between statements t∧ f 7→ {ω2}. Finally, set
λ′({ωi}) =
1
2 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, λ
′({ω1, ω2}) = λ
′({ω1, ω3}) =
3
4 , and λ
′({ω2, ω3}) =
1
4 .
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Again, we have a representation of the subject’s assessments, but this time, the
truth valuation respects all logical implications. Of course, λ is not a probability
distribution; far from it, it is not even monotone: the failure to perceive the im-
plication t ∧ f⇒t is reflected in the fact that λ(t(t)) = λ({ω2, ω3}) =
1
4 <
1
2 =
λ({ω2}) = λ(t(t ∧ f)). 
In Example 1, while it is clear that subject fails to perceive the implication
t ∧ f⇒t, the multiplicity of representations indicated that this misperception can
be captured as either a failure in logical or probabilistic reasoning. In a series of
duality results, we show that this is universally the case: for a large class of behavior
whatever can be explained by failures of probabilistic reasoning alone can be likewise
rationalized by failures of contingent thinking alone, and vice versa.1
While the entanglement of probabilistic and logical reasoning may initially feel
disappointing, we argue that this collapse is both philosophically sensible and prac-
tically beneficial. On the pragmatic side, deferring the discussion of abstract mo-
tivations, it is this duality that allows the modeler to leverage observable betting
behavior—a standard decision theoretic primitive and one often associated squarely
with probabilistic judgements—to identify much about the agent’s cognition under
limited contingent reasoning. The subject’s failure to realize t∧f⇒t, is unambigu-
ously captured by the agents preference to bet on t∧f rather than t. By appealing
to this observable primitive, we define what it means for an agent to fail to perceive
an implication while remaining agnostic as to whether these failures are modeled
directly via logical relationships (i.e., non-rational t) or indirectly via relaxations of
probabilistic thinking (i.e., non-rational λ); we show it is easy to identify the set of
logical implications perceived by the agent.
However, often the implications in question are the result of a background theory
(for example, that water boils at 100 degrees). An agent’s failure to perceive an
implication predicated on the modeler’s background theory could be a consequence
of flawed logical reasoning or of the agent entertaining a different theory. Our
next set of results show that it is possible to identify the largest sub-theory (of the
modeler’s theory) that the agent understands.
Example 2. Esponda and Vespa (2014) provided subjects with the following decision
problem (paraphrased):
A selected ball is chosen to be red with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and
otherwise blue. The subject must cast a vote for either red or blue
1However, outside of this class of behavior, we show that failures in contingent thinking are the
strictly more general explanation.
7without observing the color of the selected ball. In addition, two com-
puters observe the color of the selected ball and are programmed to
follow specific rules for casting a vote in favor of red or blue that are
contingent on the color of the selected ball. If the color chosen by a sim-
ple majority matches the color of the selected ball, the subject’s payoff
is $2; otherwise, the payoff is $0. Before casting her vote, the subject
receives information about the rule being followed by the computers and
the probability p, but does receive information about the actual votes
of the computers. Both computers follow the rule: (i) If selected ball is
red: vote red; (ii) If selected ball is blue: vote blue with probability β
and red with 1− β for fixed (and known) β ∈ (0, 1).
Notice that voting blue is a (weakly) dominant strategy since in order for a sub-
ject’s vote affect the outcome, the computers must disagree, and hence the selected
ball must be blue. Nevertheless, 80% of subjects do not play strategically (i.e., they
vote red more than 15% of the time) even after 40 rounds of play.
Lets consider the following statements (and their disjunctions, negations, etc)
regarding the decision problem:
r = “The selected ball is red.”
b = “The selected ball is blue.”
p = “The subject’s vote will determine the outcome.”
The (relevant for the discussion) rules of the game can be encoded by a modelers
theory: T = {r↔ ¬b,p→ b}—which can be read as “red if and only if not blue,”
and “if the subject is pivotal then blue.”
Assume for the sake of argument that the modeler elicited the subject’s assess-
ment of the likelihood of the various statements and found
1. pi(r) = pi(¬b) = 1− pi(b) = 1− pi(¬r) = α,
2. pi(p) > 0, and,
3. pi(r ∧ p) ≥ pi(b ∧ p)
(1) states the subject understands the way the ball is drawn, (2) states the
subject considers it possible she is pivotal and (3) corresponds to the preference
that, when her vote will determine the outcome, she prefers to vote red.
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The subject’s behavior cannot be explained by any model in which she un-
derstands all implications of the background theory T . Indeed, say the subject
represents these statements via a subjective model of uncertainty (Ω, t, λ). Notice
that under T , p is logically equivalent to p ∧ b and r ∧ p is a contradiction (i.e., is
logically equivalent to F, the variable standing for false). So if the subject under-
stands these implications we have t(r∧ p) = ∅ and t(p) = t(b∧ p). But this means
pi(r∧ p) = λ(t(r∧ p)) = 0 < pi(p) = λ(t(p)) = λ(t(b ∧ p)) = pi(b∧ p), violating (3).
Now, consider Ω = {r, b} × {p,¬p} and let t send propositions to the relevant
cylinder sets (i.e., t(r) = {(r, p), (r,¬p)}, t(r∧p) = (r, p), t(r∨b) = Ω, etc) . Let λ
be a measure such that λ({(r, p), (r,¬p)}) = α and λ((r, p)) > λ((b, p)). Obviously,
such a mapping captures the likelihood assessments (1)-(3). Also, it is completely
rational (the mapping t obeys all logcial necessities, and λ is additive) despite the
fact that it ignores the connections between b and p. The agent using this model is
rational but does not consider the theory T—although she does consider (and hence
perceives all implications of) the sub-theory {r↔ ¬b} ⊂ T . 
Our results below provide a test for whether the agent is logically flawed or
possibly just entertaining a different theory. In the later case, we show that this
theory is identifiable, and in fact, easily constructed from the observable primitive.
Notice that in the model at the end of Example 2, the statement r ↔ ¬b was
true at every state: if an agent perceives all implications of a theory T then she
assigns probability 1 to the statements that compose T . We show that under slightly
stronger rationality assumptions, this converse of this relationship holds also, so that
we can identify the theory understood by the agent by collecting the statements to
which she assigns probability 1.
3 Framework
3.1 Preliminaries
Let P collect a set of propositional variables: statements about the world that
can either be true of false. For example “It is raining” or “The S&P500 went up
today.” We assume that P contains two distinguished propositions T and F, that are
interpreted as “true” and “false” respectively. Then, L(P) is the language defined
inductively, beginning with P and such that if ϕ,ψ are in L(P) then so too are ¬ϕ,
(ϕ∧ψ), and (ϕ∨ψ). The interpretation is as in propositional logic: ¬ϕ, the negation
of ϕ, is interpreted as the statement that ϕ is not true, ϕ∧ ψ, the conjunction of ϕ
and ψ, is interpreted as the statement that both ϕ and ψ are true, and ϕ ∨ ψ, the
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disjunction of ϕ and ψ, is interpreted as the statement that at least one of ϕ and ψ
is true.
Write ϕ⇒ψ, if ψ can be deduced from ϕ under the deduction rules (and logical
tautologies) of propositional logic. For example, p⇒p ∨ q is valid implication.
Take as short-hand ϕ⇔ψ to mean that ϕ⇒ψ and ψ⇒ϕ, i.e., that ψ and ϕ are
logically equivalent. It is well known that ⇔ is an equivalence relation, so let LT(L)
collect the equivalence classes of logically equivalent formula. LT(L) is called the
Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of L, and it is a fact that LT(L) is a Boolean Algebra
under the operations inherited from the grammar.
If Ω is a set, then call t : L → 2Ω a truth valuation if t(T) = Ω and t(F) = ∅.
The interpretation is that t(ϕ) is the set of states where ϕ is true. Call t
• exact if ϕ⇔ψ implies t(ϕ) = t(ψ).
• monotone if ϕ⇒ψ implies t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ).
• symmetric if t(¬ϕ) = Ω− t(ϕ)
• ∧-distributive if t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∩ t(ψ)
• logically sound (or just sound) if it is all of the above
Remark 1. It follows from the well known fact that Boolean algebras provide se-
mantics for propositional logic—see for example Jansana (2016)—that ψ⇒ϕ iff for
every state-space Ω and every sound t : L → Ω such that t(ψ) = Ω, we have also
that t(ϕ) = Ω.
If (Ω,Σ), with Ω a set and Σ ⊆ 2Ω a field of sets, call a map λ : Σ → [0, 1]
a likelihood appraisal if λ(∅) = 0 and λ(Ω) = 1. We denote the set of likelihood
appraisals for (Ω,Σ) by Λ(Ω,Σ). Likelihood appraisals are referred to as different
things in different literatures: normalized games, grounded normalized set functions,
non monotone capacities, etc.
Call λ ∈ Λ(Ω,Σ),
• symmetric if for all A ∈ Σ, λ(A) = 1− λ(A)
• monotone (or a capacity) if for all A,B ∈ Σ with A ⊆ B, λ(A) ≤ λ(B)
• totally monotone if for any A1 . . . An ∈ Σ,
λ
( ⋃
i≤n
Ai
)
≥
∑
{I|∅ 6=I⊆{1...n}}
(−1)|I|+1 λ
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
,
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• additive (or a measure) if for all A,B ∈ Σ with A ∩ B = ∅, λ(A ∪ B) =
λ(A) + λ(B).
Remark 2. Total monotonicity implies monotonicity, and additivity is equivalent to
total monotonicity and symmetry, see for example, Grabisch et al. (2016) Figure
2.1.
Likelihood appraisals carry well-defined theory of integration: for each measur-
able x : Ω→ R and likelihood appraisal λ let,
∫
xdλ =
∫ ∞
−∞
λ({ω ∈ Ω |x(ω) ≥ r})dr. (1)
where the integral on the right hand side is the standard Lebesgue integral over
R. Notice that (1) is additive over pairwise co-monotone functions. When λ is a
capacity, (1) coincides with the usual definitions of a Choquet integration, and when
it is additive, (1) becomes the usual additive integral.
Given L a triple (Ω, t, λ) is called a subjective model of uncertainty for L where
t : L → 2Ω is a truth valuation and λ ∈ Λ(Ω,Σ) with t(L) ⊆ Σ.
3.2 Primitive
The primitive of our model is a preference relation over bets. A primitive bet on
ϕ is a function bϕ : L → [0, 1] such that b(ϕ) = 1 and b(ψ) = 0 for all ψ 6= ϕ.
The interpretation of bϕ is a bet that pays 1 (util) when ϕ is true and is called off
otherwise. A (general) bet is a finitely supported lottery over primitive bets. That
is a bet is of the form b : L → [0, 1] such that supp(b) = {ϕ ∈ L | b(ϕ) > 0} is
finite, and with
∑
ϕ∈supp(b) b(ϕ) = 1. The interpretation of b(ϕ) is the likelihood of
receiving the primitive bet on ϕ. We sometimes write {αibϕi . . . αnbϕn} to denote
the b such that supp(b) = {ϕi . . . ϕn} and b(ϕi) = αi (where, obviously, the α’s are
positive and sum to 1).
The set of all bets, B, is a mixture space when mixtures are taken pointwise.
Note, however, this is not the usual set of acts from an Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) type framework—for example, B does not contain constant acts—as we have
inverted the order of subjective and objective uncertainty. The domain of bet, L, is
not a state-space, but a set of statements representing uncertain propositions. The
state space, which encodes the possible resolutions of this uncertainty, is part of the
representation rather than the primitive.
We assume that < entertains an expected utility structure, which we axiomatize
explicitly below. This may initially seem odd, as we are interested in detailing
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failures of rationality which include failures of probabilistic reasoning. However,
our language based framework explicitly separates bets (on linguistic constructions
based on L) and acts as functions from a state-space to utils (that will be part of the
representation). Thus, our assumption of additivity is emphatically not regarding
the decision maker’s beliefs, but rather her evaluation of the objective uncertainty
over primitive bets. We simply are assuming that if the decision maker values a
bet of ϕ at 12 and values a bet of ¬ϕ at
1
4 then she evaluates the half-half mixture
between them at 38 . It is, at the same time, permissible that she evaluates a bet on
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ at 1 (or any other value).
A subjective model of uncertainty (Ω, t, λ) represents < if, for all b, b′ ∈ B, b < b′
if and only if ∑
ϕ∈supp(b)
b(ϕ)λ(t(ϕ)) ≥
∑
ϕ∈supp(b′)
b′(ϕ)λ(t(ϕ)).
4 Representations
4.1 Axioms
If we do not care at all about the properties of t then it is always possible to
construct a state space that represents <, so long as these preferences obey some
basic conditions relating to the management of objective risk:
Axiom 1—Non-Triviality (NT). bT < bϕ < bF for all ϕ ∈ L and bT ≻ bF.
Axiom 2—Objective Expected Utility (EU). < is a complete, transitive and
satisfies the Archimedean and Independence axioms.
Axiom NT states two things: first that the preferences are non-trivial, and
second that the agent understands what T and F represent. This latter restriction
is tantamount to assuming that “receive x no matter what” and “receive x never”
are unambiguous. Axiom EU plays the obvious role of providing a cardinal measure
between lotteries—as discussed above, it deals only with how the agent perceives
objective risk and not the resolution of statements in L.
Proposition 1. The following are equivalent:
1. < satisfies Axioms NT and EU, and
2. < is represented by a triple (Ω, t, λ), with λ additive.
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The state-space constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 is extraordinarily
wasteful. Essentially, in constructs independent state spaces for each statement–
exploiting the fact that t can be completely unrestricted—so that t(ϕ) 6= t(ψ) for
any statements, despite the agent perhaps understanding some logical equivalences.
In what follows we introduce additional axioms on <, nested by successive
strength, that allow the construction of subjective models with ever more struc-
ture. Of course, as we introduce more structure on t or λ, we loose the ability to
represent certain failures of contingent reasoning and the constructed state spaces
look closer and closer to those of pure rationality. Ultimately we wind up with the
prototypical rational model used in economics, with a sound t and additive λ.
The first rationality axiom concludes that the agent understands logical equiva-
lence, even if she misunderstands the relationship between other statements.
Axiom 3—Equivalence (E). If ψ⇔ϕ then bψ ∼ bϕ.
As the next proposition makes evident, Axiom E is a necessary condition to
model behavior with a sound t. Thus, no matter how much we insist on capturing
failures of reasoning via relaxations of probabilistic sophistication, without imposing
Axiom E we cannot find a representation.
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent:
1. < satisfies Axioms NT, EU and E,
2. < is represented by a triple (Ω, t, λ), with t exact and λ additive, and,
3. < is represented by a triple (Ω′, t′, λ′), with t′ sound.
Next, we assume that if the truth of ψ follows logically from the truth of ϕ then
the agent would prefer a bet of ψ than on ϕ. The interpretation, which will be
substantiated not only the immediate proposition but also by Proposition 4, is that
the agent recognized and understands implications. If ϕ⇒ψ then whenever ϕ is
true, so too is ψ, but it might still ψ alone is true, so, an agent cognizant of this
should prefer to bet on ψ.
Axiom 4—Implication (I). If ϕ⇒ψ then bψ < bϕ.
The content of Axiom I is that the resulting representation are monotone. Thus,
under the interpretation that mapping the antecedent ϕ to a subset of consequent
ψ is understanding the implication ϕ⇒ψ, then assuming an agent’s probabilistic
judgements over a state space are given by a capacity is implicitly assuming that
the agent understands all implications.
4.2 Identification 13
Primitive Representation
NT, EU and λ additive and t sound and λ:
∅ any t N/A
E t exact any λ
I t monotone λ monotone
IE t ∧-distributive λ totally monotone
A t sound λ additive
Figure 1: The relationship between axioms and representations. The last two equiv-
alences are provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. The following are equivalent:
1. < satisfies Axioms NT, EU, and I,
2. < is represented by a triple (Ω, t, λ), with λ additive and t monotone, and,
3. < is represented by a triple (Ω′, t′, λ′), with λ′ monotone and t′ sound.
In Appendix A, we provide two additional representation results. First, IE
strengthens I to deal with the case when multiple statements all imply the same
consequent. By placing bounds on the type of non-additivity that can enter the
model, the ensuing preference is represented by a totally monotone capacity or a ∧-
distributive truth function. Second, A further strengthens IE so that the likelihood
of the disjunction of pair of mutually incompatible statements is the sum of their
individual likelihoods. This ensures ‘full’ rationality, the agents preferences are
representable by a model with both a sound t and an additive λ. This spectrum of
duality results as induced by conditions on the primitive is summarized in Figure 1.
4.2 Identification
When observing an agent’s choices in a decision problem, a modeler will want to
make inference about the agent’s reasoning capabilities. However, the representation
theorems in Section 4 show that in general there will not be a unique subjective
model that represents the agent’s preferences. This is problematic, as in some
models representing the agents preferences, it might be that t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ) while in
others t′(ϕ) ( t′(ψ), leaving the matter of the agent’s belief in the implication
ϕ⇒ψ unresolved. As such we would like a notion of inference that deals directly
with primitives and is therefore invariant in the choice of representation.
For two statements, ϕ,ψ ∈ L such that ϕ⇒ψ, say that the agent (given by
<) understands that ϕ implies ψ if there exists a subjective model of uncertainty,
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(Ω, t, λ), with λ additive and such that t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ). This is the most generous
assessment of the agent’s understanding—we assume that the agent understood an
implication unless it is impossible to find a model in the implication is respected.2
The most conservative assessment, by contrast, where we define understanding to
be if and only if t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ) for all models, is trivial: the agent would understand
nothing except that F⇒ϕ⇒T (this is a consequence of the construction in the
proof of Proposition 1). Indeed, it is always possible to construct a model in which
the agent understands no non-trivial implications at all, but where her preferences
just happen workout as if she did.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ L be such that ϕ⇒ψ. Then an agent (given by <
satisfying NT and EU) understands that ϕ implies ψ if and only if bψ < bϕ.
Thus, our notion of understanding, which required quantifying over all possible
representations, is in fact captured directly by the primitive. The interpretation of
this result is far deeper than its technically simple proof might indicate: a modeler
cannot conclude with certainty that an agent fails to understand the implication
ϕ⇒ψ unless the agent would prefer to bet on ϕ than on ψ. Any indirect method
of assessment, through the use of more complex compound statements, or whatever
else, must eventually reduce to perceiving an antecedent as more likely than its
consequent. This result also shows in full force the duality between probabilistic
judgments and contingent thinking. Failures to perceive implications, as permitted
by the construction of a model with a flawed t, are exactly non-monotonicities in
probabilistic judgement.
5 Identifying Theories
All of the above deals only with understanding implications that are dictated purely
by the rules of logic and so do not depend in any way on the interpretation of the
propositional variables. That p ∧ q⇒p in no way depends on the meaning of the
statements p and q. Often, however, the implications we have in mind arise from
non-logical relationships between propositional variables. For example, if p = “the
water is boiling” and q = “the temperature is above 150 degrees” then our physical
understanding of the world dictates that q implies p, despite them being logically
independent statements.
2It may seem contrived that we look only at representations with additive λ, but it is essentially
without loss of generality. Indeed, the more permissive definition, which requires only that t(ϕ) ⊆
t(ψ) and λ(t(ϕ)) ≤ λ(t(ψ)) leads to the same characterization. Additionally, by considering additive
likelihood assessments, we narrow in failures of logical thinking.
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The relationship between propositional variables can be encoded by a collection
of statements, called a theory, that are presupposed to be true. This physical theory
of water above can be captured by the presupposition of T = {¬q ∨ p}. Given the
the theory T , p can be deduced from q (i.e., p can be deduced from q and the
elements of the theory, under the usual rules of propositional logic). In order for a
theory to be sensible it must be consistent, that is, it must not contain statements
that contradict one another.
A modeler will often have in mind some specific theory, T , and will judge the
reasoning capabilities of agents not against logical necessity but also their under-
standing of T . An agent who believes it more likely the water is above 150 degrees
than that it is boiling, exhibited by bq ≻ bp, might be a flawed logical reasoner, or
she might misunderstand the meaning of the statements (perhaps interpreting ‘de-
grees’ in Fahrenheit rather than Celsius). In what follows we provide a framework
for disentangling these two notions, and for identifying the largest sub-theory of the
modelers theory that the agent understands.
Formally, call T ⊂ L a theory if (i) it is closed under logical implication, and (ii)
F /∈ T .
Remark 3. It follows from the compactness theorem for propositional logic—see
for example Cowen (1970)—that if no contradiction can be derived from any finite
subset of S ⊂ L then S is satisfiable in its entirety. Thus, if S ⊂ L is such that
there does not exist a finite set S ′ ⊆ S such that
∧
S′ ϕ⇒F, then the closure of S
under implication, T , is a theory and there exists a (Ω, t) with t sound such that
t(ϕ) = Ω for all ϕ ∈ T . It is therefore without loss of generality to identify a non
contradictory collection of statements with the theory induced by closing off under
implication.
Given a theory T , we can consider the theory specific notion of implication:
ϕ
T
⇒ψ if ψ can be deduced from ϕ and T under the deduction rules (and logical
tautologies) of propositional logic.3
For example, if T = {¬q∨ p}, q
T
⇒p, although it is not true that q⇒ p. There-
fore, the distinction between ⇒ and
T
⇒ provides the distinction between being a
flawed logical reasoner (failing to understand a ⇒ implication) and not entertaining
the same theory (failing to understand a
T
⇒ implication), where failing to under-
stand an implication of either type means preferring to bet on the antecedent (i.e.,
generalizing the definition in Section 4.2).
That is to say: we can repeat the exercise presented in Section 4 using
T
⇒ in
3Thus we could view regular implication as the theory specific implication induced by the set of
all logical tautologies.
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place of vanilla implication. Specifically, say that t is T -monotone if ϕ
T
⇒ψ then
t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ), and likewise say that < satisfies T -I if ϕ
T
⇒ψ then bψ < bϕ. It is
straightforward to see that the relation established in Proposition 3 continues in
this T -specific setup. That is, < satisfies T -I if and only if it can be represented by
some (Ω, t, λ) with an additive λ and a T -monotone t.
This generalization does much more that simply allow us to discuss theory spe-
cific implication: it allows a modeler to identify the that underlies the agent’s pref-
erences. Suppose the modelers conception of the world was given by a theory T .4
If an agent understands all logical implications of her knowledge, but considers a
different theory than the modeler then her preferences will satisfy I but not T -I.
It is of practical value then to try and elicit what is the largest sub-theory of
T consistent with the agent’s preferences. The following result states that this is
possible: there exists a unique largest sub-theory of S ⊆ T such that the agent
understands all S-implications (i.e., the agent fails to understand some implication
of any proper superset of S).
Proposition 5. Let < satisfy NT, EU and I. Let T be a theory. Then there exists
a unique sub-theory S ⊆ T such that < satisfies S-I and for any S ⊂ S ′ ⊆ T , <
does not satisfy S ′-I.
Thinking along the lines of Example 2, the rules of a economics experiment can
be coded in a theory T which is presupposed by the modeler. A subject who makes
choices inconsistent with T can therefore not be both logically omniscient and also
presuppose T . The experimenter can, as shown by Proposition 5, identify which
rules the subject understood, this is the largest sub-theory of T consistent with her
behavior.
An agent who understands T -implication, whose preferences satisfy T -I, believes
the statements of T to be true (that is, in any representation, λ(t(ϕ)) = 1 for
ϕ ∈ T ). This follows from the fact that T
T
⇒ϕ, for ϕ ∈ T , and the definition of T -I.
Thus there is a relationship between an agent’s knowledge and her understanding of
implication. Under I, this relationship is one directional, as the following example
points out: it is possible to believe a statement to be true, but not understand its
implications.
Example 3. Let L be generated by two primitive propositions, p and q. Let Sp be
the closure of {p} under implication and Sq the closure of {q}.
4If we insist that the modeler harbors no uncertainty about the decision problem—when, for
example, the analysis is done ex-post—then T will be maximal: it will contain either ϕ or ¬ϕ for all
ϕ ∈ L. Any representation of a maximal theory has λ(t(ϕ)) ∈ {0, 1}, so all uncertainty is resolved.
In fact the converse is also true: the set of maximal theories corresponds exactly the set non-trivial
{0, 1}-valued finitely additive measures over LT(L).
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Now consider the model Ω = {ω}, λ(ω) = 1, and t that maps Sp and Sq to
Ω and all other statements to ∅. By construction, t is monotone. Also, by some
interpretation the agent here modeled would know the theory {p}—she assigns
probability 1 to (all direct entailments of) p. However, the agent would not be
{p}-monotone, and therefore does not truly understand the theory.
To see this note that at ω, q holds. Further, under the theory {p} one can
deduce from q that p ∧ q is true. However, t(p ∧ q) = ∅ ( t(q). 
Strengthening the logical reasoning we require of the agent creates a tighter link
between knowledge and understanding implication. In particular, if we require that
the agent’s preferences are represented by (Ω, t, λ) with λ additive and t not only
monotone but ∧-distributive, then the collection of statements the agent believes
(i.e., assigns probability 1 to) is a theory—something that was not the case in
Example 3 above. But more than that, as shown by the result below, this theory
completely determines the set of implications the agent understands.
Proposition 6. Let < satisfy NT, EU and IE. Let T be a theory and S ⊆ T the
unique largest sub-theory such that < satisfies S-I. Then S = {ϕ ∈ T | bϕ < bT}.
While Proposition 5 ensures that under I there exists a largest sub-theory of
the modeler’s theory that coheres with the agents preference, it does nothing to
explicitly construct it. If we a permit slightly strengthening the assumptions on the
agent’s reasoning capabilities, then this construction comes for free: Proposition 6
states that this sub-theory is exactly the intersection of the modeler’s theory and
the statements the agent believes to be true.
6 Discussion and Related Literature
Loosely speaking, the failures of contingent thinking discussed in the literature in
psychology and economics can be classified into two types: failures of probabilistic
reasoning and failures of logical reasoning. Explanations of the first type explain
behavior by assuming that agents’ subjective models of uncertainty do not con-
form to the usual rules of probability. Such models include ambiguity aversion
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Schmeidler, 1989), over weighting small probabilities
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982), correlation neglect (Golub and Jackson,
2010; Enke and Zimmermann, 2019), etc.
Explanations of the second type posit that agents’ subjective models of uncer-
tainty do not conform to the usual rules of logic, specifically, they fail to perceive
that some contingencies imply others. While experimental evidence has pointed
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towards explanations of this later type, general models of such behavior are less
pervasive—perhaps because modeling an agent’s understanding of implication seems
more involved than generalizing probability measures.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983), in a series of experiments that serve as the basis
for Example 1, discovered the conjunction fallacy, where subjects rank a statement
of the form p ∧ q as strictly more likely than the corresponding statement q. Since
this is a logical impossibility irrespective of the interpretation of propositions p
and q, their findings provide unambiguous evidence of systematic misperception of
implications.
Esponda and Vespa (2014), extending the idea behind the winner’s curse (Thaler,
1988), argue that subject’s inclination to play dominated strategies arises from their
failure to properly condition on the relevant contingencies; for example, a bidder in
a common value auction failing to realize that conditional on submitting the high-
est bid, she also had the highest private signal. In these environments, subject’s
behavior can explained by the thesis that they fail to perceive (or they ignore) the
implications between various uncertainties (e.g., that winning implies a higher than
average bid).
Mart´ınez-Marquina et al. (2019) examine such failure of contingent reasoning in
the presence of uncertainty and “propose that aggregating over multiple possible
values of the state is especially difficult when there is uncertainty. ” The connection
between logical and probabilistic reasoning, as outlined in this paper, can provide a
theoretical justification for this result: as errors in probabilistic thinking can often
be equivalently characterized as errors in contingent thinking, it stands to reason
that eliminating external probabilistic uncertainty will reduce the contingent errors
made by subjects. Taken to the extreme, if an agent has a subjective model of
uncertainty, (Ω, t, λ) with t exact, than certain statements (i.e., statements that are
implied by T) are always mapped to the entirety of Ω and assigned λ-probability 1.
As such, in the absence of any uncertainty whatsoever, we should see no failure of
contingent reasoning.5
Agranov et al. (2020) find that subject’s deliberately randomize their actions
across identical decision problems, and conclude “ at least part of the mixing be-
havior observed in probability matching decisions comes from subjects’ difficulty in
thinking contingently.” In line with findings above, they further see that subject’s
randomize less when uncertainty about each decision problem is resolved sequen-
tially, rather than only after all decisions have been made. This adds weight to
5Of course, even if all uncertainty is eliminated from the experimenter’s perspective, there may
be structural or background uncertainty harbored by the subject, see Footnote 4.
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the observation that higher exposure to uncertainty seems to exacerbate failures of
contingent reasoning.
Our paper also contributes to the methodological literature on experimental de-
sign, as it provides a methodology for discerning between irrational subjects who
have true violations of logical thinking from subjects who misunderstood or misinter-
preted experimental instructions. Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) provide convincing
evidence that observations often explained by behavioral biases might actually be
the result of failing to understand instructions. Our results establish how to test
for this in a more universal way, and show how to identify which instructions were
misunderstood.
There are some models of strategic interaction, for example cursed equilibrium,
(Eyster and Rabin, 2005) or behavioral equilibrium (Esponda, 2008), that account
for agents failing to understand implicative relation between other agent’s actions
and their private information. For example cursed equilibrium “assumes that each
player incorrectly believes that with positive probability each profile of types of the
other players plays the same mixed action profile that corresponds to their average
distribution of actions, rather than their true, type-specific action profile.”
Our paper is also relevant to the decision theoretic literature that dispenses
with logical or probabilistic omniscience. While the probabilistic side has been well
explored—see Machina and Siniscalchi (2014) for an overview—decision theoretic
models of relaxed logical reasoning are less prevalent. Lipman (1999) presents a
model in which agents may consider impossible states of affairs. This violates our
exactness axiom, although is permitted in our most general framework. Recently,
in the economics literature, Sadler (2020) explores belief updating in the face of
contradictory claims. This follows on the extensive literature on belief revision
centered in epistemic logical via philosophy and computer science: for examples
see Alchourro´n et al. (1985); Martins and Shapiro (1988); Friedman and Halpern
(1999); Ga¨rdenfors (2003); Van Benthem (2007). More broadly, our paper shares
much, both mathematically and philosophically, with logical representations of knowl-
edge and awareness, see Halpern (2017) for an overview.
Closely related to the methodology of our paper are models of syntactic decision
theory, where the primitive relates to statements about the world rather than se-
mantic acts or lotteries, principally Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and Blume et al.
(2009) and to a lesser extent Piermont (2017); Kochov (2018) and Minardi and Savochkin
(2019). The only of these models to deal with failures of logical implication, as we do,
is Tversky and Koehler (1994). In contrast to the present paper, Tversky and Koehler
take the state space as a primitive object and are concerned with a particular (prob-
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abilistically sophisticated) representation of conditional judgements (i.e., the prob-
ability of ϕ given ψ). Like the model we present here, a key aspect of Blume et al.
(2009) is that the state-space is part of the representation rather than the primitive,
so that the interpretation of uncertainty becomes purely subjective.
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A Additional Representation Results
In this section we provide two additional axioms and corresponding restrictions on
the representations. The later less interesting case, included simply for completeness,
is that of full rationality, where t is sound and λ is additive. The more interesting
and subtle case concerns a decision maker whose beliefs can be represented by a
totally monotone capacity, often called a belief function following Dempster (1967)
and Shafer (1976).
Axiom 5—Inclusion/Exclusion (IE). Set {ϕ1 . . . ϕn} and let ψ be such that
ϕi⇒ψ for all i ≤ n. Set Let E and O denote the (non-empty) subsets of {1, . . . n}
with even and odd numbers of elements, respectively. Moreover, for any I ⊆
{1, . . . n} let ϕI be shorthand for
∧
i∈I ϕi. Finally, set m = max{|E| + 1, |O|}.
Then { 1
m
bψ,
1
m
bϕI , (1−
|E|+ 1
m
)bF
}
I∈E
<
{ 1
m
bϕI , (1 −
|O|
m
)bF
}
I∈O
.
Under Axioms NT and EU, Axiom IE implies I (and hence E). This follows
immediately from taking a singleton ϕ. Axiom IE, an admittedly somewhat mechan-
ical reproduction of total monotonicity to our decision theoretic primitive, ensures
that < might be represented by a sound t and totally monotone λ. The additional
equivalence postulated below, however, is not trivial: representation by a totally
monotone λ (and sound t) is equivalent to representation by a ∧-distributive t and
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additive λ. In particular, this shows that if an agents preferences can be represented
by a belief function, then in any additive representation the agent never considers
contradictory statements possible simultaneously—and immediate consequence of
∧-distributivity.
Proposition 7. The following are equivalent:
1. < satisfies Axioms NT, EU, and IE,
2. < is represented by a triple (Ω, t, λ), with λ additive and t exact and ∧-
distributive, and,
3. < is represented by a triple (Ω′, t′, λ′), with λ′ totally monotone and t′ sound.
Proof of Proposition 7. We will show (1) implies (3) implies (2) implies (1). Assume
(1). Then by Since under Axioms NT and EU Axiom IE implies I, Proposition
3 requires that there exist a representation of <, (Ω, t, λ), with λ monotone and t
sound. Since t is sound, hence a Boolean homomorphism, t(L) is a field of sets.
Assume without loss of generality Σ = t(L). We will show that in fact, λ is totally
monotone.
Indeed, let A1 . . . An ∈ Σ. Since Σ = t(L), there exists ϕi such that t(ϕi) = Ai
for i ≤ n. Set ψ =
∨
i≤n ϕi. Clearly, ϕi⇒ψ, so Axiom IE therefore dictates that
{ 1
m
bψ,
1
m
bϕI , (1−
|E|+ 1
m
)bF
}
I∈E
<
{ 1
m
bϕI , (1 −
|O|
m
)bF
}
I∈O
,
where E, I and m are defined in Axiom IE. Given the representation, where ϕI =∧
i∈I ϕi we have
1
m
λ(t(ψ)) +
∑
I∈E
1
m
λ(t(ϕI)) ≥
∑
I∈O
1
m
λ(t(ϕI))
which, given the logical omniscience of t provides t(ψ) =
⋃
i≤n t(ϕi) =
⋃
i≤nAi and
t(ϕI) =
⋂
i∈I t(ϕi) =
⋂
i∈I Ai is exactly the dictate of total monotonicity.
Now assume (3), that < is represented by (Ω′, t′, λ′) with λ′ totally monotone.
Let Ω be the set of all non-empty subsets of Ω′ and let Σ denote the algebra generated
by the principal ideals of Ω′: {{A ∈ Ω′|A ⊆ B} | B ∈ Ω′}.
By Theorem A of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) there exists an additive λ ∈
Λ(Ω,Σ) such that
λ′ =
∫
Ω
uAdλ(A)
where uA is the capacity on Ω defined by
uA(B) =
{
1 if A ⊆ B
0 otherwise.
Finally set t(ϕ) = {A ∈ Ω | A ⊆ t′(ϕ)}. Owing to the logical omniscience of t′, we
have t(ϕ∧ψ) = {A ∈ Ω | A ⊆ t′(ϕ)∩ t′(ψ)} = t(ϕ)∩ t(ψ), so that t is ∧-distributive
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(and it is obliviously exact). Moreover,
λ(t(ϕ)) =
∫
Ω
1{A∈Ω|A⊆t′(ϕ)}dλ =
∫
Ω
uA(t
′(ϕ))dλ(A) = λ′(t′(ϕ)),
so (Ω, t, λ) represents <.
Finally, assume (2), that < is represented by (Ω, t, λ) with λ additive and t exact
and ∧-distributive. By Remark 4, t is monotone. Take some {ϕ1 . . . ϕn} and let ψ
be such that ϕi⇒ψ for all i ≤ n.
By the monotonicity of t, t(ψ) ⊇ t(ϕi) for each i and hence t(ψ) ⊇
⋃
i≤n t(ϕi),
indicating λ(t(ψ)) ≥ λ(
⋃
i≤n t(ϕi)). Since λ is additive, we know that
λ(
⋃
i≤n
t(ϕi)) =
∑
{I|∅ 6=I⊆{1...n}}
(−1)|I|+1 λ
(⋂
i∈I
t(ϕi)
)
=
∑
{I|∅ 6=I⊆{1...n}}
(−1)|I|+1 λ
(
t(ϕI)
)
,
where ϕI =
∧
i∈I ϕi, and the final equality comes form ∧-distributivity. Setting
m = max{|E| + 1, |O|} we see that
1
m
λ(t(ψ)) +
∑
I∈E
1
m
λ(t(ϕI)) ≥
∑
I∈O
1
m
λ(t(ϕI)),
where E and O are as defined in Axiom IE, which shows via the representation that
Axiom IE holds. 
And now, the axiom that delivers full rationality, reminiscent of so many inde-
pendence type axioms:
Axiom 6—Additivity (A). If ϕ ∧ ϕ′⇒F then {12bϕ,
1
2bϕ′} ∼ {
1
2bϕ∨ϕ′ ,
1
2bF}.
Under AxiomsNT and EU, Axiom A implies IE (and hence I and E). However,
this is a bit of a pain to prove directly—hint, its inductive—but it is obviously
implied by our representation theorems. It is straightforward, to show that Axiom
A implies I, and is the content of Lemma 1 in the proof of the main proposition.
Proposition 8. The following are equivalent:
1. < satisfies Axioms NT, EU, and A, and,
2. < is represented by a triple (Ω, t, λ), with λ additive and t sound.
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we prove the following simple lemma:
Lemma 1. Under Axioms NT and EU, Axiom A implies I.
Proof. Let ϕ⇒ψ. Set ϕ′ = (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ). Then we have ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧
(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)⇔ψ ∧T⇔ϕ and ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)⇔F. So, we have that {12bϕ,
1
2b(ψ∧¬ϕ)} ∼
{12bψ,
1
2bF}, which given Axioms NT and EU clearly implies bψ < bϕ. ⋆
By by the above lemma and Proposition 3, there exists a representation of <,
(Ω, t, λ), with λ monotone and t sound. Since t is sound, hence a Boolean homo-
morphism, t(L) is a field of sets. Assume without loss of generality Σ = t(L). We
will show that in fact, λ is additive.
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Indeed, let A,B ∈ Σ with A ∩B = ∅. Since Σ = t(L), there exists ϕA, ϕB such
that t(ϕA) = A and t(ϕB) = B. Set ψ = ϕA ∨ ϕB . The soundness of t provides
t(ϕA ∧ϕB) = A∩B = ∅ = t(F), so ϕA ∧ϕB⇔F. Axiom A therefore dictates that
{12bϕA ,
1
2bϕB} ∼ {
1
2bψ,
1
2bF} or, given the representation
1
2
λ(t(ϕA)) +
1
2
λ(t(ϕB)) =
1
2
λ(t(ψ)) +
1
2
λ(t(F))
which, given that t(ψ) = t(ϕA ∨ ϕB) = t(ϕA) ∪ t(ϕB) and t(F) = ∅ is
λ(A) + λ(B) = λ(A ∪B),
showing that λ is additive. 
B An application to Rationalizability in Games
B.1 Integral Representations
In this section we investigate the model under only our most minimal restrictions
for a logically sound representation, that is, under Axioms NT, EU, and E. Even
under the weak assumption E, we can unambiguously assign utility values to more
general class of acts which map statements into outcomes.
Towards this, define a strategy to be mapping s : L → R with finite support.
Notice that a primitive bet, defined in Section 3.2, is a special type of strategy,
where the support is a singleton. Let S denote the set of strategies, and notice that
S is a mixture space under pointwise mixtures. Let MS denote the set of lotteries
over S, referred to as mixed strategies. The set of all bets, B, is contained inside of
MS.
Let <˙ be a preference relation over MS, and let < denote its restriction to B.
Assume that (Ω, t, λ) represents <, with t sound—thus, < satisfies NT, EU, and
E. Under t, a strategy is naturally associated to a t(L)-measurable function from Ω
to R, via:
t◦ : s 7→
∑
supp(s)
s(ϕ)1t(ϕ). (2)
Notice t◦ is the unique linear function satisfying t◦(bϕ) = 1t(ϕ). Say <˙ has an
integral-representation if: <˙ is linear in mixtures and for all pure strategies, s, s′ ∈ S,
s<˙s′ if and only if ∫
t◦(s)dλ ≥
∫
t◦(s
′)dλ.
Remark 4. Naturally, we might ask, when does <˙ have an integral representation?
We briefly remark on the answer to this question, but for the sake of brevity, do not
go into details. Under the map t◦ we can identify strategies as functions Ω → R.
Thus, we can place axioms directly on acts over Ω, and use t−1◦ to pull back the
restrictions to our primitive. On this space we can employ the usual Anscombe-
Aumann type axiomatic structure.
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Say that <˙ is obvious dominant if for all x, x′ : Ω → R such that minΩ x(ω) ≥
maxΩ y
′(ω) we have s<˙s′ for all s ∈ t−1◦ (x) and s
′ ∈ t−1◦ (x
′). Then, in a straightfor-
ward generalization of Schmeidler (1986): <˙ is a continuous weak order, satisfying
co-monotone independence and obvious dominance, if and only if it has an integral
representation with a general λ (strengthening obvious dominance to monotonicity
provides that λ is a capacity and further strengthening co-monotone independence
to full independence provides λ is additive).
It is perhaps worth pointing out that our notion of obvious dominance coincides
with that of Li (2017). 
To relate to the above established duality of in the representation, we would
like to extend our notion of an integral representation to (Ω′, t′, λ′), another repre-
sentation of <, with t′ exact but not necessarily sound, and λ′ additive. However,
the mapping t◦ makes sense only for sound t. To see this consider the strategy s
given by its support: ϕ 7→ 1 and ¬ϕ 7→ 1. Read in natural language, the strategy
pays 1 if either ϕ or ¬ϕ, and 0 elsewhere, which should reasonably identified with
the strategy s′ given by ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ 7→ 1. However, if t′ is not symmetric, for example
if t′(ϕ) ( Ω \ t(¬ϕ) then blindly applying (2) yields for s a function that is 1 on
t′(ϕ) ∪ t(¬ϕ) 6= Ω and 0 elsewhere and for s′ a constant function 1.
While it is certainly possible that the framing of a strategy could impact how
a decision maker interprets it, in the paper we eschew such additional constraints
on the agent’s cognition. That is to say, we assume that when agent observers the
strategy s paying the same across both ϕ and ¬ϕ she identifies s with the strategy
whose payment is contingent on ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. This assumption has the added benefit of
being able to harness our earlier duality results for practical uses, as it allows the
modeler freedom in her choice of representation.
Formally, let (Ω′, t′, λ′), with t exact and λ′ additive, be a representation of <.
We will define a map t′• : R
L → RΩ
′
/
λ′
∼ where the co-domain is the equivalence
classes of λ′-almost-everywhere equal functions.
Towards this, for any (Ω, t, λ), with t sound, consider any t(L)-measurable x :
Ω → R map with finite image {α1, . . . , αn}, where αk > αk+1. For every k =
1, . . . , n − 1 choose some ϕk ∈ t
−1 ◦ x−1({α1, . . . , αk}). Then, (defining αn+1 = 0)
set the map:
ξtt′ : x 7→
[
n∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)1t′(ϕk)
]
, (3)
where the brackets [·] indicate the
λ′
∼ equivalence class. This is well defined since if
ϕ,ψ ∈ t−1(A), then λ′(t′(ϕ)) = λ′(t′(ψ)) = λ(t(A)) by definition of a representation
so the resulting functions are λ′-almost-everywhere equal for any choice of ϕ1 . . . ϕk.
Lemma 2. The map ξtt′ ◦ t◦ is unique (in t) λ
′-almost everywhere.
As a result of Lemma 2 we can define the map t′• : R
L → RΩ
′
/
λ′
∼ as ξtt′ ◦ t◦ for
any choice of representation (Ω, t, λ) with t sound.
Example 4. Let L be defined over the propositions p, q. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Let
λ be the capacity defined by λ({ω1}) = λ({ω3}) = λ({ω1, ω2}) = λ({ω2, ω3}) =
1
3
and λ({ω2}) = 0 and λ({ω1, ω3}) =
2
3 . Let t be the (sound) truth valuation defined
28 B An application to Rationalizability in Games
RL RΩ
RΩ˜ RΩ
′
/
λ′
∼
t◦
t˜◦
t′•
ξt
t′
ξt˜
t′
Figure 2: The map t• is defined by the commutative square above.
t◦(s)
ω1 ω2 ω3
t˜◦(s)
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω1 ω2 ω3
t′•(s)
Figure 3: The maps t◦(s), t˜◦(s) and t
′
•(s) from Example 4.
by t(p) = {ω1, ω2} and t(q) = {ω1}, and t˜ be the (sound) truth valuation defined by
t˜(p) = {ω1} and t˜(q) = {ω1, ω2}. Notice that both (Ω, t, λ) and (Ω, t˜, λ) represent
the same <.
Further consider the exact, monotone truth valuation t′ defined by t′(p ∧ q) =
t′(p ∨ q) = t′(p) = t′(q) = {w1} and t
′(¬p ∧ ¬q) = t′(¬p ∨ ¬q) = t′(¬p) = t′(¬q) =
{w2}. Then if λ
′ is the uniform (additive) measure on Ω, the (Ω, t′, λ′) is also a
representation of <.
Now consider the strategy s : T 7→ 1; p 7→ 2;¬q 7→ 1. The maps t◦(s) and t˜◦(s)
are given by the top half of Figure 3. Notice that
ξtt′ ◦ t◦(s) = 21t′(T ) + 1t′(p) + 1t′(p∧¬q)
= 21Ω + 1ω1 + 1∅
= 21t′(T ) + 1t′(p) = ξ
t˜
t′ ◦ t˜◦(s),
so that our initial choice of model was irrelevant. 
Proposition 9. Let (Ω, t, λ) and (Ω′, t′, λ′) be a representations of < with t sound,
t′ exact and λ′ additive. Then for all strategies s : L → R,∫
t◦(s)dλ =
∫
t′•(s)dλ
′.
Corollary 1. Let <˙ admit an integral representation. Then (Ω, t, λ), with either
t sound or t exact and λ additive, is an integral representation if and only if it is a
representation of <.
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B.2 Rationalizability
In this section, we use the above established results to examine the problem of
determining rationalizability under non-expected utility beliefs. We assume a fixed
L and the existence of a ‘true’ or ‘objective’ state-space Ω along with a sound truth
valuation t : L → Ω. With only slight hyperbole, this is the implicit set up of all
economic applications of decision making under uncertainty. A strategy s : L → R,
in this setup, is often associated directly with its representation as a function over
Ω→ R via the (often implicit) map t◦.
Let A ⊆ S denote a finite set of (pure) strategies that are available to the decision
maker. Suppose that the decision maker can randomize over this set of strategies.
Then the set of mixed strategies available is the convex hull of A, denoted by co(A),
a subset of MS.
Often a modeler will ask, after observing the choice s ∈ A of the agent, was this
choice rationalizable? In other words, is there a subjective model of uncertainty that
the decision maker might hold that would yield s as the utility maximizing choice
from A. Of course, since we have fixed both the state space and the truth valuation,
the modeler’s question reduces to the search for a λ ∈ Λ(Ω, t(L)) such that∫
t◦(s)dλ ≥
∫
t◦(s
′)dλ
for all s′ ∈ A.
The celebrated result of Wald (1949) and Pearce (1984) provide an elegant so-
lution when we restrict ourselves to additive likelihood assessments.
Lemma 3 (Wald-Pearce). Let A ⊂ RΩ be finite. Then x ∈ A is a rationalizable
via an additive measure if and only if x is pointwise undominated in co(A) (where
mixtures are taking pointwise).
Of course, we may want to allow a larger class of likelihood estimates to serve as
potential rationales which in turn might permit the rationalization of more strate-
gies. The following simple example illustrates.
Example 5. Let L be defined over the single proposition p and set Ω = {ω1, ω2},
and t the sound truth valuation given by t(p) = {ω1}. Consider three strategies:
s1 = p 7→ 1, s2 = ¬p 7→ 1 and s3 : T 7→
1
3 . Using the above theorem we see there is
no additive λ that rationalizes s3, seen by the fact that
1
2t◦(s1) +
1
2t◦(s2) = (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
strictly pointwise dominates t◦(s3) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ).
However, s3 can be rationalized by relaxing the additivity requirement on the
likelihood assessment, for example consider the monotone λ give by λ(ω1) = λ(ω2) =
1
4 . We see that ∫
t◦(s3)dλ =
1
3
>
1
4
=
∫
t◦(s1)dλ =
∫
t◦(s2)dλ,
So s3 is a best response to the subjective belief embodied by λ. 
Mathematically, when we allow for non-additive rationalizations, the convex
hull of A is not the right space to search for dominance as we can find dominated
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strategies that are in fact best responses. However, our duality results above point
out that if (Ω, t, λ) represents the agent’s preferences then we can find an alternative
(Ω′, t′, λ′) with t exact and λ′ additive. Over this space, the Wald-Pearce Lemma
applies.
Along this line of thought, the modeler could take the ‘objective’ model (Ω, t) and
transform it into a model (Ω′, t′) in which t need not be sound. Then, supposing
at an additive measure λ′ on Ω′ could be pulled back into an arbitrary λ on Ω
such that (Ω, t, λ) and (Ω′, t′, λ′) represent the same <, the modeler could check for
rationalization in the additive model. Of course, by Proposition 9, the strategies in
question must be transformed via t′•.
The lingering concerns are then (i) the possible choices for (Ω′, t′) are so immense
they are not even a set, and (ii) given a particular choice, can we transform λ′ into
λ is a suitably regular way so as to preserve representation. To circumvent these
issues we restrict ourselves to the maximal model relative to the objective model
(Ω, t): take as given the sound model (Ω, t) and for each A ∈ t(L) − {Ω,∅} let
ΩmA = {0A, 1A} and Ω
m =
∏
t(L)Ω
m
A . Set t
m : ϕ 7→ 1t(ϕ) (and t(T) ∋ ϕ 7→ Ω, t(F) ∋
ϕ 7→ ∅). We call (Ωm, tm) the maximal model relative to (Ω, t). The construction in
Proposition 2 shows that that every exact preference < is represented by a maximal
model with an additive λ (in particular maximal relative to the canonical model).
Proposition 10. Fix L and (Ω, t) with t sound. Let A ⊂ S be finite. Then s ∈ A is
a rationalizable via a likelihood function if and only if tm• (s) is pointwise undominated
in co(tm• (A)).
Example 5 (continued). Recall the model from earlier in the example: Ω = {ω1, ω2},
and t(p) = {ω1}. Put the notation A = t(p) = ω1 and A = t(¬p) = ω2. The
maximal model for our Ωm = {(1A,B ), (1A, 0B), (0A, 1B), (0A, 0B)} with t : p 7→
{(1A,B ), (1A, 0B)} and ¬p 7→ (1A, 1B), (0A, 1B)}.
The three strategies considered were s1 = p 7→ 1, s2 = ¬p 7→ 1 and s3 : T 7→
1
3 ,
which correspond to
tm• (s1) =


(1A, 1B) 7→ 1
(1A, 0B) 7→ 1
(0A, 1B) 7→ 0
(0A, 0B) 7→ 0
tm• (s2) =


(1A, 1B) 7→ 1
(1A, 0B) 7→ 0
(0A, 1B) 7→ 1
(0A, 0B) 7→ 0
tm• (s3) =


(1A, 1B) 7→
1
3
(1A, 0B) 7→
1
3
(0A, 1B) 7→
1
3
(0A, 0B) 7→
1
3
From this vantage, it is clear that s3 is undominated as it is the only strategy that
yields a positive payoff in state (0A, 0B). Hence we can conclude immediately that
there is a likelihood function that rationalizes s3 in the original model. 
C Proofs omitted from the text
Lemma 4. The following are true: (i) If t is exact and ∧-distributive it is monotone.
(ii) If t is exact, symmetric and ∧-distributive it sound. (iii) If h : Ω → Ω′ is a
Boolean homomorphism, then h ◦ t : L → Ω′ is sound whenever t is.
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Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Let ϕ⇒ψ then ϕ⇔ϕ ∧ ψ so t(ϕ) = t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∩ t(ψ)
where the first equality follows from exactness and the second ∧-distributivity. (ii)
This follows from the fact that t is a homomorphism from L, seen as the term alge-
bra defined by the grammar, to the powerset of Ω, seen as a Boolean algebra, and
that Boolean homomorphisms preserve logical validity. (iii) This is immediate from
(ii). 
Proof of Proposition 1. That (2) implies (1) is trivial. We first show the exis-
tence of a representation for primitive bets. By standard arguments, there exists,
for each ϕ ∈ L a unique pi(ϕ) ∈ [0, 1] such that pi(ϕ)bT + (1 − pi(ϕ))bF ∼ bϕ. For
each ϕ ∈ L − {T,F} let Ωϕ = {0ϕ, 1ϕ} and let λϕ ∈ ∆(Ωϕ) be the measure such
that λϕ(1ϕ) = pi(ϕ). Then a representation, for primitive bets, follows by setting
Ω =
∏
LΩϕ, t : ϕ 7→ 1ϕ (and T 7→ Ω,F 7→ ∅) and λ to the corresponding product
measure. Again, the standard inductive argument extends this representation to
arbitrary bets using Independence. 
Proof of Proposition 2. That (3) implies (1) straightforward. That (1) implies (2)
follows from a slight variant of the proof of proposition 1, where L is quotiented by
logical equivalence. We show that (2) implies (3).
Let (Ω, t, λ) be a representation given by (2), with λ additive. Set [ϕ] = {ψ ∈
L | ϕ⇔ψ}. By the Stone representation theorem, LT(L) is embeddable in the
powerset of a some set Ω′, by some Boolean-homomorphism, h. Set Σ = h(LT(L)),
which is a field of sets. Let t′ : L → Ω′ be given by t′ : ϕ 7→ h([ϕ]). By Lemma
4(iii), t′ is sound. Set λ′(t′(ϕ)) = λ(t(ϕ)) which is well defined since t is exact. 
Proof of Proposition 3. That (2) implies (1) straightforward. We first show
that (1) implies (3). Since Axiom I trivially implies Axiom E, we have that <
is represented by a triple (Ω′, t′, λ′), with t sound. Since t is sound, hence a Boolean
homomorphism, t(L) is a field of sets. Assume without loss of generality Σ = t(L).
We will show that in fact, λ′ is monotone. Indeed, let A,B ∈ Σ with A ⊆ B.
Since Σ = t(L), there exists ϕA, ϕB such that t(ϕA) = A and t(ϕB) = B. Logical
omniscience provides t(ϕA ∧ ϕB) = A ∩ B = A. Moreover, it is a logical tautology
that (ϕA∧ϕB)⇒ϕB : so by Axiom I, bϕB < bϕA∧ϕB , and hence λ
′(t(ϕB)) ≥ λ′(t(ϕA∧
ϕB)), or λ′(B) ≥ λ′(A).
Now we show that (3) implies (2). Let (Ω′, t′, λ′) be a representation given by
(3). Let Ω = [0, 1], Σ the Borel σ-algebra, and λ ∈ Λ([0, 1],Σ) the Lebesgue mea-
sure on [0, 1]. Let t be the map t : ϕ 7→ [0, ν(t′(ϕ))] (whenever λ′(t′(ϕ)) > 0 and ∅
otherwise). Let ϕ⇒ψ. Then since t′ is sound t′(ϕ) ⊆ t′(ψ), and since λ′ is mono-
tone, λ′(t′(ϕ)) ≤ λ′(t′(ψ)). Hence t(ϕ) = [0, ν(t′(ϕ))] ⊆ [0, ν(t′(ψ))] = t(ψ). So t is
monotone as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The only if direction is trivial. So assume ϕ⇒ψ and
bψ < bϕ. By Proposition 1, there exists some (Ω
′, t′, λ′) representing < with λ ad-
ditive. Let Ω = [0, 1], Σ the Borel σ-algebra, and λ ∈ Λ([0, 1],Σ) the Lebesgue
measure on [0, 1]. Let t be the map t : ϕ 7→ [0, λ′(t′(ϕ))] (whenever λ′(t′(ϕ)) > 0
and ∅ otherwise). Since bψ < bϕ we have λ
′(t′(ψ)) ≥ λ′(t′(ψ)) hence t(ϕ) ⊆ t(ψ),
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and so such a model exists. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let S = {S ′ ⊆ T |< satisfies S ′-I}. Let S =
⋃
S
S ′ ⊆ T .
(Since < satisfies Axiom I, the set S contains the set of all logical tautologies, and
so is non-empty.) The proposition follows if < satisfies S-I.
Let ϕ0
S
⇒ψ. Definitionally, there is a finite collection of statements {η1 . . . ηn} ⊆
S such that ϕ0
∧
1≤i≤n ηi⇒ψ. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Si ∈ S contain ηi and set
ϕi = ϕ
∧
j≤i ηj. Then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have ϕi−1
Si⇒ϕi.
We have bψ < bϕn < bϕn−1 . . . < bϕ0 . The first preferential relation comes
from Axiom I and the others by applying Si-I for each i. By the transitivity of <,
bψ < bϕ0 , so < satisfies S-I as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 6. That S ⊆ {ϕ ∈ T | bϕ < bT} follows immediately from S-I
the fact that T
S
⇒ϕ for all ϕ ∈ S. We will here show the converse.
First, let (Ω, t, λ), with λ additive and t exact and ∧-distributive, represent <,
the existence of which is guaranteed by Proposition 7. Let ϕ ∈ T be such that
bϕ < bT. Let S
′ = S ∪ {ϕ}. The proposition follows if < satisfies S ′-I, since this
would imply, by the definition of S, that S ′ ⊆ S.
Let ψ
S′
⇒ η. Definitionally, this means there is a (possibly tautological) statement
ζ ∈ S such that ψ∧ϕ∧ζ⇒ η. The converse already established that bζ < bT. So we
have that λ(t(ζ)) = λ(t(ϕ)) = 1. Since t is ∧-distributive, we have that t(ψ∧ϕ∧ζ) =
t(ψ) ∩ t(ϕ) ∩ t(ζ). Then, the additivity of λ provides λ(t(ψ ∧ ϕ ∧ ζ)) = λ(t(ψ)).
Moreover, since ψ∧ϕ∧ ζ⇒ η and t is exact and ∧-distributive, hence monotone,
we have t(ψ) ⊇ t(ψ∧ϕ∧ ζ), indicating λ(t(η)) ≥ λ(t(ψ∧ϕ∧ ζ)) = λ(t(ψ)) and thus
that bη < bψ. So < satisfies S
′-I as desired. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let (Ω, t, λ) be a representation of < with t sound. Take
s : L → R and set x = t◦(s) with range {α1, . . . , αn} where αk > αk+1.
Now, consider the set B = {supp(s) ∩ T | T is a maximal theory of L}.6 Enu-
merate B as B1 . . . Bm and let ϕi =
∧
Bi
ϕ and βk =
∑
Bi
s(ϕ). Without loss of
generality assume that βi ≥ βi+1.
It is well known that if t : L → Ω is sound then for all ω ∈ Ω, Mω = {ϕ ∈
L | ω ∈ t(ϕ)} is maximally consistent and hence x(ω) =
∑
supp(s)∩Mω
s(ϕ) = βi for
some i ≤ m.
For each i ≤ m, set ψi =
∨
{ϕj | βj ≥ βi}. Now if βi = αk for some k, then
by construction ψi ∈ t
−1 ◦ x−1({α1, . . . , αk}) and so λ
′(t′(ψi)) = λ
′(Ek). Further, if
βi /∈ {α1, . . . , αn}, then t(ψ) = ∅ so in particular, λ
′(t′(ψi)) = 0. Thus the function
m∑
i=1
(βi − βi−1)1t′(ψi),
which does not depend on t, is λ′-almost everywhere equal to ξtt′ ◦ t◦. 
6Recall a theory T is maximal if it is a theory—it is closed under implication and F /∈ T—and
for every ϕ ∈ L either ϕ ∈ T or ¬ϕ ∈ T . Alternatively, the maximal theories of L are exactly the
ultrafilters on L under the partial order ⇒ .
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Proof of Proposition 9. Follows from definitions, where {α1, . . . , αn}, with αk >
αk+1, is the range of t◦(s):
∫
t′•(s)dλ
′ =
∫
ξtt′(t◦(s))dλ
′
=
n∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)λ
′(t′(ϕk))
=
n∑
k=1
(αk − αk+1)λ(t(ϕk))
=
∫
t◦(s)dλ
′
Where only the third equality is not definitional, and follows from the fact that both
(Ω, t, λ) and (Ω′, t′, λ′) are representations of <. 
Proof of Proposition 10. First, assume that s ∈ A is a rationalizable via (Ω, t, λ)
for a likelihood function λ so that∫
t◦(s)dλ ≥
∫
t◦(s
′)dλ, (4)
for all s′ ∈ A. Let < be the preference represented by (Ω, t, λ);
Let λmA ∈ Λ(Ω
m
A ) be the measure λ
m
A (1A) = λ(A), and λ
m the corresponding
product measure over Ωm. By construction, λm(tm(ϕ)) = λm(1t(ϕ)) = l(t(ϕ)), so
that (Ωm, tm, λm) represents <. Proposition 9 indicates∫
tm• (s)dλ
m ≥
∫
tm• (s
′)dλm
for all s′ ∈ A. So by the Wald-Pearce Lemma, tm• (s) is undominated in co(t
m
• (A)).
Now, assume tm• (s) is pointwise undominated in co(t
m
• (A)). By the Wald-Pearce
Lemma, we have the existence of an additive λm such that (Ωm, tm, λm) rationalizes
tm• (s): that is ∫
tm• (s)dλ
m ≥
∫
tm• (s
′)dλm (5)
for all s′ ∈ A. Let < be the preference represented by (Ωm, tm, λm).
Construct λ ∈ Λ(Ω, t(L)) by λ(A) = λm(1A). For any ϕ ∈ L, by construction,
λ(t(ϕ)) = λm(1t(ϕ)) = λ
m(tm(ϕ)) so (Ω, t, λ) represents <. Thus, by Proposition 9,
applied to (5), we have ∫
t◦(s)dλ ≥
∫
t◦(s
′)dλ,
for all s′ ∈ A: s ∈ A is a rationalizable. 
